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 Improving Hedge Fund 
Governance 
 This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the internal governance of hedge funds. The primary components of hedge 
fund governance are investors with a high propensity to exercise their short-term redemption rights; managers with high pay-
performance sensitivity, because they are being compensated with an annual performance-based fee plus earnings from their 
own investment in the funds they manage; sophisticated investors who demand quality governance; and short-term creditors 
and derivatives counterparties who provide close monitoring. Hedge fund governance needs the most improvement in the 
areas of performance reporting (valuation) and the timing of performance-fee calculations. Further, counterintuitively, in 
some circumstances investors may benefit from less disclosure, higher fees, and less access to their capital. 
 HOUMAN B. SHADAB 
 The hedge fund industry is currently at a cross-roads where several fundamental trends meet. Capital is fl owing into the industry from insti-
tutional investors like never before. In the fi rst half 
of 2014, $56.9 billion was allocated to hedge funds 
globally, causing the industry to near $3 trillion in as-
sets for the fi rst time. 1 At the same time, hedge fund 
performance in absolute terms has trailed the stock 
market for fi ve consecutive years, causing investors to 
raise concerns about fees and other aspects of their 
investments. In addition, there are now a number 
of alternatives to hedge funds that are cheaper and 
have more investor-friendly characteristics, and that 
are competing for institutional investors. These alter-
natives include regulated mutual funds that employ 
hedge fund-like investment strategies. 2 
 Underlying these trends is the growing importance 
to investors of the internal governance of hedge funds. 
Since the fi nancial crisis of 2008, concerns about 
hedge fund governance have centered on transparency, 
operational practices, and the growing view that fund 
directors do not effectively monitor fund managers. 
The June 2012 enforcement action by the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
against the prominent hedge fund manager Phillip 
Falcone exemplifi es these governance concerns. The 
SEC alleged that Falcone misappropriated investor as-
sets and granted favorable treatment to some investors 
without the knowledge of the fund’s directors or other 
investors. 3 As a result of such developments, major 
institutions are increasingly refusing to invest in hedge 
funds that fail to meet their governance standards. 
 There is reason to focus on these governance issues. 
Hedge fund governance matters to investors because 
better governance can lead to higher returns. Gover-
nance matters to managers because better governance 
can help managers raise and retain capital. The grow-
ing focus on governance, combined with the increas-
ing number of hedge funds competing for capital, has 
resulted in greater bargaining power for investors 
concerning fees and other governance devices. 
 This article provides a comprehensive analysis of 
the internal governance of hedge funds. Hedge fund 
governance is a form of managerialism because the 
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3 SEC, “Philip A. Falcone and Harbinger Charged With Securi-
ties Fraud” (Press Release, June 27, 2012), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-122.htm.
1 “Hedge Fund Capital Surges to New Milestone on Strong 2Q 
Inflows” (Press Release, Hedge Fund Research, July 18, 2014), avail-
able at https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/pr_20140718.pdf.
2 “Deutsche Bank Study Shows Investor Demand Fuelling Dramatic 
Growth of Hedge Fund Liquid Alternatives” (MarketWatch, Sept. 8, 
2014), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/deutsche-bank-
study-shows-investor-demand-fuelling-dramatic-growth-of-hedge-
fund-liquid-alternatives-2014-09-08?reflink=MW_news_stmp.
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funds’ underlying legal regime gives managers near 
complete authority over the structure and operations 
of the funds they manage. At the same time, hedge 
fund governance is also uniquely  responsive in the 
sense that, to obtain and retain investor capital, hedge 
fund managers must be highly responsive to the pref-
erences of equity investors (the limited partners). This 
responsiveness arises from a fundamental dynamic of 
hedge fund governance—the propensity of investors 
to “pull the plug” and cash out of a fund if they are 
dissatisfi ed. Although hedge fund investors usually 
face short-term redemption restrictions, they typi-
cally can disrupt the operations of a fund, or even 
cause it to wind down in a few months to a year, by 
withdrawing their capital. 
 The primary components of hedge fund governance 
consist of: 
 Investors with a high propensity to exercise their • 
short-term redemption rights; 
 Managers with high pay-performance sensitiv-• 
ity, because they are compensated with an annual 
performance-based fee plus gains on their own 
investment in the funds they manage; 
 Sophisticated investors who demand quality gover-• 
nance; and 
 Short-term creditors and derivatives counterparties • 
who provide close monitoring. 
 The hedge fund governance regime is also notable 
for what it lacks. Not only do hedge funds lack per-
manent or long-term capital but hedge fund managers 
are not subject to stringent board oversight, removal 
by investors, or any market for corporate control. 
Unlike private equity and venture capital funds, hedge 
funds are not organized as “closed-end” funds for 
a fi nite (e.g., 10-year) duration and, hence, are not 
subject to the discipline of being required to return 
capital to investors at the end of a specifi ed invest-
ment lifecycle. 
 This is not to say that hedge fund managers are 
systematically ripping off investors. Empirical stud-
ies do not fi nd pervasive or signifi cant fraud or other 
types of agency costs. In addition, empirical studies 
strongly suggest that hedge funds outperform stock 
and bond markets on a risk-adjusted basis even after 
managers are paid their fees. For example, a study 
of hedge fund performance from January 1994 to 
September 2008 found that most hedge fund invest-
ment strategies returned alpha and that alpha did not 
decrease on an industry-wide level over that time. 4 
Another study of hedge fund returns, which included 
data regarding over 20,000 funds from January 1994 
to December 2010, found signifi cant hedge fund al-
pha of 5.2 percent annually (using the study’s most 
conservative estimate). 5 In addition to outperforming 
the stock market on a stand-alone basis, numerous 
studies fi nd that hedge funds can help to diversify, 
and hence improve the performance of, a traditional 
investment portfolio of stocks and bonds. 6 
 Nonetheless, there is still plenty of room for 
improvement in hedge fund governance. The areas 
needing the most improvement are (1) performance re-
porting (valuation) and (2) the timing of performance-
fee calculations. Investors should be careful of what 
they wish for, however, when choosing or negotiating 
governance structures. Although investors generally 
benefi t from low fees and signifi cant transparency 
and liquidity, if investor-friendly governance devices 
are improperly structured or taken too far, investors 
run the risk of undermining the unique performance-
based incentives and other governance mechanisms 
that enable hedge funds to produce superior returns 
in the fi rst place. Counterintuitively, investors may 
benefi t from less disclosure, higher fees, and less ac-
cess to their capital. 
 BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 A “hedge fund” consists of three basic entities: 
 1. The fund itself; 
 2. The fund’s management company; and 
 3. The fund’s equity investors. 
4 Manuel Ammann, Otto R. Huber & Markus M. Schmid, “Has 
Hedge Fund Alpha Disappeared?” (Unpublished manuscript, Sept. 
24, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532742.
5 Juha Joenväärä, Robert Kosowski & Pekka Tolonen, “New 
‘Stylized Facts’ About Hedge Funds and Database Selection Bias” 
3 (Unpublished manuscript, Oct. 25, 2013), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1989410.
6 See, e.g., Wolfgang Bessler, Julian Holler & Philipp Kurmann, 
“Hedge Funds and Optimal Asset Allocation: Bayesian Expecta-
tions and Spanning Tests,” 26 Fin. Mkts. Portfolio Mgmt. 109, 
136-138 (2012).
Although investors generally benefit from low fees and significant transparency and 
liquidity, if investor-friendly governance devices 
are improperly structured or taken too far, 
investors run the risk of undermining the unique 
performance-based incentives and other 
governance mechanisms that enable hedge funds 
to produce superior returns in the first place.
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10 See Glocap Search, Inc. & Hedge Fund Research, Inc., 2011 
Glocap Hedge Fund Compensation Report.
11 Gregory Zuckerman, Juliet Chung & Michael Corkery, 
“Hedge Funds Cut Back on Fees” (Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 2013), 
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127
887323893004579054952807556352.
12 Gokce Soydemir, Jan Smolarski & Sangheon Shin, “Hedge 
Funds, Fund Attributes and Risk Adjusted Returns 7 (Unpub-
lished manuscript, Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1896524.
7 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-403 (West 2012).
8 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 
194 (1963); SEC, Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-
Dealers (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf; see especially discussion at p. 
22. Only under limited circumstances have hedge fund managers 
been found to owe a duty to investors directly. United States v. 
Lay, 612 F.3d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 2010); Retirement Program for 
Employees of Fairfield v. Madoff, No. X05CV0950115618, 2010 
WL 2106654 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2010).
9 See Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, 
No. 5502-CS, 2011 WL 3505355, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011) 
(“As a matter of default law, Paige General Partner clearly owes 
fiduciary duties to the limited partners in the Hedge Fund.”).
 Management Compensation. Under the terms of 
the manager’s agreement with the fund it advises, the 
management company is compensated in part by a 
management fee. The management fee ranges from 1 to 
2 percent of the fund’s net asset value and is calculated 
monthly or quarterly. The manager is also compen-
sated with a performance fee averaging approximately 
18 percent of the annual profi ts of the fund. 10 
 A defi ning feature of hedge funds is that their 
management companies are also compensated based 
upon the performance of the funds they advise. Fund 
performance typically is calculated on an annual basis. 
Hedge fund performance-based fee rates average 18 
percent of profi ts in excess of prior losses and net of 
management fees. 11 
 Contractual provisions requiring the fund to exceed 
a threshold level of returns  before any compensation 
is allocated to the manager typically limit managers’ 
performance-based compensation. One such provi-
sion is a high-water mark, which limits the perfor-
mance allocation to positive gains above the amount 
of the investor’s capital contribution. A high-water 
mark requires any losses from previous years to be 
recouped fi rst, meaning that an investor must actually 
receive a net positive return on its investment before a 
manager is paid a performance fee. High-water marks 
are utilized by most hedge funds. When hedge funds 
use high-water marks, they typically charge inves-
tors a performance fee fi ve times higher than those 
funds that do not (i.e., 15.3 percent versus about 3 
percent), likely in exchange for investors not having 
to pay a performance fee until the fund produces a 
profi t for them. 12 Because investors may invest at dif-
ferent times, a process known as share equalization 
must be undertaken to ensure that performance fees 
 Organizing the fund as either a U.S. limited partner-
ship or an offshore corporation affords the hedge 
fund manager overwhelming fl exibility in managing 
its operational practices and carrying out its invest-
ment strategy. The general partner of a hedge fund 
limited partnership is responsible for managing all as-
pects of the fund’s business, including its investment 
portfolio. 
 Hedge Fund Limited Partnerships. A hedge fund limited 
partnership’s general partner serves as the fund’s 
portfolio manager and investment adviser. Because the 
general partner bears unlimited liability for any debts 
the partnership itself cannot satisfy, 7 it is organized as 
a limited liability entity to prevent the manager from 
being subject to personal liability. The fund’s general 
partner (management company) is governed by its 
operating agreement which determines issues such as 
how the manager’s profits and losses are allocated and 
the terms of withdrawal. 
 Fiduciary Duties. Fiduciary duties imposed on 
the management company stem from two sources. 
First, as investment advisers, federal law imposes fi -
duciary duties on hedge fund management compa-
nies of loyalty and care to the funds they advise. 8 
These duties include providing independent invest-
ment advice that is suitable for the fund; putting the 
fund’s interests above the adviser’s own; and disclos-
ing any potential confl icts of interest between the ad-
viser and the fund, including the general nature of 
any preferential treatment to some investors. Second, 
state-level limited partnership law typically imposes 
default fi duciary duties upon managers. 9 Although fi -
duciary duties are generally viewed as contractual in 
nature and may be eliminated entirely in the fund’s 
operating agreement, in practice, hedge funds typi-
cally do not entirely eliminate the fi duciary duties the 
management company (general partner) owes to the 
limited partners. 
 A defining feature of hedge funds is that their management companies are also 
compensated based upon the performance of 
the funds they advise. 
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18 See, e.g., Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 17-302(b) (“[T]he partner-
ship agreement may grant to all or certain identified limited part-
ners or a specified class or group of limited the partners the right 
to vote separately or with all or any call or group of the limited 
partners or the general partners, on any matter.”).
19 Managed Funds Ass’n, Sound Practices for Hedge Fund 
Managers 11 (2009). Partnership statutes expressly allow for a 
partnership agreement to completely eliminate any voting powers 
of limited partners. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-302(f) (“A 
partnership agreement may provide that any limited partner or class 
or group of limited partners shall have no voting rights.”).
20 See Alexander Ineichen, AIMA’s Roadmap to Hedge Funds, 
8 (12th ed., Alt. Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n, 2012), available at http://
www.aima.org/download.cfm/docid/E9031A27-E978-4009-
85EA1A8D325DAF7D; James D. Spellman, Hedge Funds: How 
They Serve Investors in U.S. and Global Markets 10 (Coal. of 
Private Inv. Cos., 2009), available at http://www.hedgefundfacts.
org/hedge/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Hedge_Funds.pdf.
21 James R. Barth, Tong Li, Triphon Phumiwasana & Glenn 
Yago, Hedge Funds: Risks and Returns in Global Capital Markets 
38-41 (Milken Inst., 2006) (finding that a majority of hedge funds 
have a lock-up period of less than one quarter). Hedge funds may 
also use “soft” lockups that allow investors to redeem during their 
lock-up period by paying the fund a penalty fee for doing so.
22 Ross Ford, Joe Childs & Graeme Terry, “Liquidity: Overview 
of Hedge Fund Liquidity Structures” (Hedge Fund Spotlight, Dec. 
2012, at 2, available at https://www.preqin.com/docs/newsletters/
hf/Preqin_HFSL_Dec_2012_Liquidity_Structures.pdf.
13 Sangheon Shin, Jan Smolarski & Gokce Soydemir, “For 
Whom Hurdle Rate and High-Watermark Exist?” 30-31 (Unpub-
lished manuscript, Sept. 30, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2154639.
14 Id.
15 George O. Aragon & Vikram Nanda, “On Tournament Behav-
ior in Hedge Funds: High Water Marks, Fund Liquidation, and the 
Backfilling Bias,” 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 937, 946 (2012) (finding that, 
among the hedge fund managers investigated, 32 percent had personal 
wealth invested); Haitao Li, Xiaoyan Zhang & Rui Zhao, “Investing 
in Talents: Manager Characteristics and Hedge Fund Performances,” 
46 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 59, 65 (Feb. 2011).
16 Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 406(a) (2001).
17 The extraordinary matters over which limited partners have 
consent rights include amending the partnership agreement and sale 
of at least substantially all of the partnership’s assets outside the 
ordinary course of business. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 406(b).
wide-ranging authority to manage all aspects of the hedge 
fund’s business, including its investment portfolio. 
 The limited partners provide capital as the fund’s 
equity investors. Although limited partnership statutes 
permit a partnership agreement to grant voting rights 
to limited partners, 18 hedge fund limited partnerships 
do not typically grant limited partners any voting 
rights or the ability to nominate directors. 19 The hedge 
fund management company directly or indirectly 
owns all of the fund’s voting shares in a separate class 
with no economic rights. 20 Accordingly, the limited 
partners of a hedge fund are passive investors whose 
decision-making is limited to deciding when and how 
much capital to contribute or redeem. 
 Hedge funds also place signifi cant short-term re-
strictions on investors’ ability to redeem their capital 
and to resell or otherwise transfer their shares. A fund 
operating agreement typically restricts investors’ abil-
ity to withdraw capital to a periodic basis, such as 
monthly, quarterly, or semi-annually, and may permit 
the manager to completely bar withdrawals at its dis-
cretion. In addition, investors must typically give 30 
to 90 days’ notice before withdrawing capital. Hedge 
funds may also implement an initial lockup period 
that prohibits the withdrawal of a capital contribution 
after it is fi rst invested in the fund. Lockup periods 
generally range from less than one quarter to one full 
year. 21 A 2012 industry study found the average hedge 
fund redemption period to be 35 days and the average 
lockup period to be 5.85 months. 22 Hedge funds may 
subject to high-water marks are properly calculated 
with respect to each investor. 
 A second limit on managerial performance-based 
competition is a hurdle rate, which prevents the man-
ager from being paid unless a minimum rate of return 
is achieved. Hurdle rates may be calculated annually or 
on a cumulative basis and may be fi xed at an absolute 
rate or depend on some other rate or performance 
benchmark. High-water marks are more common than 
hurdle rates. Approximately 19 percent of hedge funds 
use hurdle rates, 13 and, when a hurdle is used, it is typi-
cally in conjunction with a high-water mark. 14 
 In addition to performance fees, a manager’s own 
investment in the fund may be a source of compensa-
tion. Managers often co-invest a signifi cant portion of 
their own capital directly in the underlying funds they 
manage. It is estimated that between 59 percent  and 
32 percent of managers have personal wealth in their 
funds. 15 Managers with higher co-investment may be 
less likely to use a high-water mark, since co-investment 
can be a substitute incentive alignment device. 
 Limited Investor Rights. Under limited partnership 
law, the hedge fund manager (general partner) has the 
exclusive right to manage the company, 16 except with 
respect to a few extraordinary issues. 17 In addition, a 
hedge fund’s limited partnership operating agreement 
contractually defines the rights and duties between the 
fund manager and the limited partner investors. The 
agreement empowers the management company with 
 Managers with higher co-investment may be less likely to use a high-water mark, since 
co-investment can be a substitute incentive 
alignment device. 
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24 Judgment of Aug. 26, 2011, Weavering Macro Fixed Income 
Fund Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Peterson, Grand Court, Cayman 
Islands (Cause No. FSD 113 of 2010).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (2012).
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2012).
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012).
28 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (2012).
29 Hedge funds operate so as to qualify for at least one of two 
exclusions from the definition of an investment company. Under 
the Investment Company Act, hedge funds are excluded from the 
definition of investment company so long as they have no more than 
100 investors and sell their securities only through a private sale. 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1). Further, hedge funds are excluded from the 
definition of investment company so long as they only sell securities 
to “qualified purchasers” through a private sale. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3(c)(7). Qualified purchasers include both natural persons owning 
at least $5 million in investments and certain companies with at 
least $100 million in securities investments. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)
(51)(A)(i); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-1(g)(2) (2005).
23 See, e.g., BVI, Cayman and Jersey Hedge Funds 20 (Walk-
ers Global, 2012), available at http://hb.betterregulation.com/
external/Global%29%20Hedge%20Funds%20%28Client%20
Guide%29.pdf (The Cayman Islands Monetary Authority “requires 
a minimum of 2 individual directors for registered funds.”); Jonathan 
Fitzgibbons, “Cayman Islands: Starting a Cayman Islands Hedge 
Fund” (Mondaq, May 9, 2012), available at http://www.mondaq.
com/x/131154/Banking/So+You+Want+To+Start+A+Hedge+Fund.
investors and overseeing third-party administrators 
responsible for preparing fi nancial statements and 
determining the fund’s net asset value. 24 
 In practice, the oversight role hedge fund directors 
play does not seem to be rigorous—probably because 
directors are appointed by managers (as opposed to 
investors), often sit on the boards of numerous funds, 
and/or lack the requisite fi nancial expertise or indepen-
dence from fund managers to provide independent and 
disinterested oversight. Hedge fund directors are also 
not subject to any form of market for corporate con-
trol. Hedge fund investors usually do not have voting 
shares and hence lack the ability to replace directors. 
 Federal Law. In the United States, federal law indirectly 
impacts how hedge funds are governed by providing 
assurance to investors against fraud and by mandating 
certain disclosures and business conduct standards. 
The primary federal statutes that apply to hedge funds 
are the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers 
Act), 25 the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 26 and 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act). 27 Although hedge funds’ investing and trading 
activities are subject to the Investment Company Act 
of 1940, 28 hedge funds limit their investor base by 
number and wealth-qualifications so as to be exempt 
from its regulation. 29 The Investment Company Act 
also use a contractual provision known as a “gate” to 
limit how much capital can be withdrawn on a given 
date. Gates usually limit investor redemptions to 
10 percent to 25 percent of the value of the fund, but 
they may also (or in the alternative) limit redemptions 
to a portion of the investor’s own capital. Hedge funds 
may also segregate a portion of an investor’s capital 
into an illiquid “side pocket” that prevents the inves-
tor from withdrawing its capital until the manager 
actually exits the investment. 
 Hedge Fund Corporations. Two-thirds of hedge funds 
globally are organized outside of the United States in 
an “offshore” jurisdiction, such as the Cayman Islands, 
and they are typically organized as corporations. 
U.S.-managed hedge funds are organized in offshore 
jurisdictions primarily to appeal to non-U.S. 
investors seeking confidentiality, to permit U.S. tax-
exempt investors (e.g., pension funds and charitable 
organizations) to take advantage of potentially 
beneficial tax treatment from investing offshore, and 
to afford greater flexibility via exclusion from U.S. 
investment company regulation. 
 From a governance point of view, the most distin-
guishing aspect of offshore hedge funds is that, unlike 
most of their U.S.-based peers, offshore hedge funds 
typically have a board of directors. This is because 
offshore funds are typically organized as corporations 
(which must have boards as a matter of basic corpo-
rate law) or are located in jurisdictions, such as the 
Cayman Islands, that require funds organized in the 
jurisdiction to have boards. 23 Offshore hedge funds 
also sometimes list their shares on stock exchanges 
that mandate independent directors as part of their 
listing requirements. 
 The duties of hedge fund directors are similar to 
those of public company directors. Hedge fund direc-
tors have a duty to act in the best interests of the fund 
without any confl icts. They must also independently 
“exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence” in fur-
thering the fund’s interests, which requires proactive 
supervision and information gathering. This oversight 
role includes monitoring the manager’s investment 
performance and adherence to its investment policy, 
the fund’s compliance with applicable laws and regu-
lations, and disclosures to and treatment of the fund’s 
 Two-thirds of hedge funds globally are organized outside of the United States in an 
“offshore” jurisdiction, such as the Cayman 
Islands, and they are typically organized as 
corporations. 
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34 Notwithstanding the fact that hedge funds privately raise 
capital in reliance upon Regulation D of the Securities Act, such 
an offering is fully subject to the Act’s antifraud provisions.
35 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
36 Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j; Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2007).
37 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51737 (2000).
38 Larry D. Soderquist, Understanding the Securities Laws § 
14:5 (4th ed. 2004).
39 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203.1, 275.204-1.
40 The Investment Adviser Public Disclosure website is located 
at http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov.
41 See SEC, Form ADV pt. 2.
42 SEC, Form PF, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf; Reporting by Investment Advis-
ers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and 
Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. 3308, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128 (Oct. 31, 2011).
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(1); SEC, Form N-1A Items 3, 5, 
10, 14-15 (requiring disclosure of information including contact 
information of the fund’s investment advisers and portfolio manag-
ers, the history of the fund, its risk/return profile and investment 
objectives, the fund’s organization, and how the fees it charges to 
investors are calculated). Registered investment companies must 
also disclose portfolio holdings quarterly to the SEC and semian-
nually to investors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(a)-(b), (e); 17 C.F.R. §§ 
270.30b1-1, b1-5, e-1. Open-end registered investment companies 
must daily calculate net asset value and allow investors to redeem 
shares within seven days at that value. 15 U.S.C § 80a-22(e); 17 
C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (requiring registered investment companies 
to sell, redeem, or repurchase shares at net asset value); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 270.22c-1(b) (requiring registered investment companies to 
calculate net asset value at least daily).
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(b), 80b-3(l), 80b-3(m).
32 To qualify for a private offering, hedge funds generally limit 
their investor base almost exclusively to accredited investors, which 
include institutions with at least $5 million in assets and natural 
persons whose net worth (or whose joint net worth with a spouse) 
exceeds $1 million or who have an annual income for the last two 
years of at least $200,000 (or $300,000 in joint spousal income). 
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
33 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-(8). Prohibition of Fraud by Advis-
ers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44756, 
44759 (Aug. 9, 2007).
from limited partner investors, hedge funds are subject 
to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act. 34 Under Securities Act Section 17(a), it is 
unlawful for any issuer to make an untrue statement of 
material fact or to omit any fact so that a statement that 
was made is misleading. 35 Under Exchange Act Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, material omissions in connection 
with the sale of any security are likewise prohibited. 36 
Rule 10b-5-1 prohibits hedge fund managers from 
using material nonpublic information to purchase or 
sell securities (insider trading). 37 In addition, under 
various provisions of the Exchange Act and Securities 
Act, hedge funds are prohibited from manipulating the 
prices of publicly or privately held securities. 38 
 The Advisers Act requires registered hedge fund 
managers to electronically fi le and keep current Form 
ADV with the SEC. 39 All parts of Form ADV, except 
for an investment brochure, must also be made avail-
able to the public on the Investment Adviser Public 
Disclosure website. 40 The brochure must be written 
in “plain English” and be provided to prospective 
clients and annually to existing clients. Part 1 of Form 
ADV requires managers to disclose basic information 
relating to the fi rm and its business, so as to assist 
regulators with oversight. Part 2 of Form ADV re-
quires a manager to disclose information relating to 
potential confl icts of interest and other issues, includ-
ing fees and how they are calculated, client referrals, 
disciplinary history, and the manager’s supervision of 
personnel. 41 For the purposes of assisting regulatory 
authorities in preserving fi nancial stability, registered 
hedge fund advisers with at least $150 million in 
assets under management must also disclose details 
about their funds’ investment positions, counterpar-
ties, and other information on Form PF to the SEC, 
which makes the form available to the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council. 42 Hedge funds must also 
subjects regulated funds to wide-ranging and detailed 
regulation, 30 including substantial limitations on a 
fund’s use of leverage and ability to engage in short 
sales and derivatives transactions. 
 All U.S.-based hedge fund managers must register 
under the Advisers Act, unless they fall within an 
exemption, such as advising funds with less than 
$150 million in assets under management or qualify-
ing as a foreign private adviser. 31 Hedge funds also 
raise capital privately, so as not to be subject to the 
Securities Act’s mandatory registration and disclosure 
obligations required of companies making a public 
offering of securities. 32 
 Registered and unregistered hedge fund managers 
are subject to the provisions of the Advisers Act prohib-
iting material misstatements to, misleading omissions 
to, and other fraudulent practices against investors or 
prospective investors. 33 In addition, in raising capital 
 Registered and unregistered hedge fund managers are subject to the provisions of the 
Advisers Act prohibiting material misstatements 
to, misleading omissions to, and other fraudulent 
practices against investors or prospective 
investors. In addition, in raising capital from 
limited partner investors, hedge funds are subject 
to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act 
and the Exchange Act. 
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45 See, e.g., Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D. Daniel & Narayan Y. 
Naik, “Flows, Performance, and Managerial Incentives in Hedge 
Funds” 30 (EFA 2003 Annual Conference, Paper No. 501, July 22, 
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424369 (finding that 
“money-flows chase recent good performance”); Andrea Beltratti 
& Claudio Morana, “Aggregate Hedge Funds’ Flows and Returns,” 
18 App. Fin. Econ. 1755, 1755-57 (2008).
46 Guillermo Baquero & Marno Verbeek, “A Portrait of Hedge 
Fund Investors: Flows, Performance and Smart Money,” 6-7 
(Unpublished manuscript, Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=773384 (finding that hedge fund investors rapidly 
withdraw capital from underperforming funds).
47 Ineichen, supra note 20 (“Governance has become a ‘make 
or break’ area in the investment decision-making process.”).
48 Letter from Kurt Silberstein, Senior Portfolio Manager, 
Global Equity, & Craig Dandurand, Portfolio Manager, Global 
Equity, to CalPERS Hedge Fund Partners (Mar. 11, 2009) (on file 
with author).
49 See, e.g., Corporate Governance in Hedge Funds: Inves-
tor Survey 2011 (Carne Global Fin. Servs., 2011), available at 
http://www.carnegroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Carne-
Hedge-Fund-Governance-Survey.pdf; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
Transparency Versus Returns: The Institutional Investor View of 
Alternative Assets 50 (2008), available at www.qrmo.com/pdf/
PwC_alternatives_briefing.pdf.
43 First, hedge funds must disclose large shareholdings of public 
companies. To regulate the market for control of public companies, 
Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g) require that hedge funds or 
their advisers disclose beneficial ownership of greater than 5 percent 
in a class of voting shares of securities registered under the Act and 
disclose whether the purpose of such ownership is to acquire or 
influence the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (g); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-
1(a). In connection with preventing insider trading, Section 16(a) 
requires that hedge funds, upon acquiring a 10 percent ownership 
stake in any issuer’s class of voting equity securities registered pursu-
ant to the Exchange Act, must disclose such ownership, any other 
equity ownership in the company, and any subsequent changes in 
such ownership. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(3)(B); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1, 
240.16a-2. In addition, under Section 13(f) hedge funds owning 
more than $100 million in stock traded on a national exchange 
are required to quarterly disclose to the public all of their equity 
holdings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(b); Disclosure of Short Sales and 
Short Positions by Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange 
Act Release No. 58,785, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,678 (Oct. 17, 2008).
44 Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Invest-
ment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2204, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74714 (Dec. 24, 2003).
the fund’s past performance. 45 Investors are also quick 
to withdraw their capital from poorly performing 
funds. 46 In addition to performance, hedge fund 
investors care about governance. Institutional hedge 
fund investors typically demand some threshold level of 
quality with respect to governance and will withdraw 
their funds, or refuse to invest in the first place, if the 
fund lacks the desired quality. 47 For example, in 2009 
CalPERS stated that it would no longer invest in hedge 
funds in which manager compensation was perceived 
as misaligning incentive. 48 
 Investor Demand for Quality Governance. Given that 
investors base their investment decisions in part 
upon the hedge funds’ perceived governance quality, 
it is important to note the specific governance (and 
operational) characteristics that investors consider to 
be high quality. Investor surveys indicate a substantial 
degree of uniformity and sophistication regarding the 
types of governance and operational characteristics 
they demand. 49 
 Unsurprisingly, hedge fund investors have strong 
preferences when it comes to risk. Investors demand 
comply with other disclosure requirements under the 
Exchange Act arising out of any large equity invest-
ments in public companies. 43 
 The Advisers Act also requires hedge fund manag-
ers to keep specifi c business and accounting records, 
to protect any client assets over which the fund has 
legal custody, and ensure that their own personnel 
comply with federal securities law and regulation. 
Rule 206(4)-7 under the Advisers Act requires fund 
managers to establish a compliance program that 
includes written policies and procedures and a desig-
nated chief compliance offi cer. 44 These requirements 
have spurred a renewed focus on compliance and best 
practices by market participants. 
 HEDGE FUND GOVERNANCE DEVICES 
 In response to market pressures, managers adopt 
 investor-friendly governance devices that reduce 
agency costs and provide additional assurance over 
and above applicable federal and state law. Hedge 
fund governance devices fall into three categories: 
those that are driven directly by equity investors, those 
that arise from managers’ performance-based com-
pensation, and those that are required by the funds’ 
short-term creditors. 
 Investor-Driven Governance. Despite being subject to 
short-term restrictions on their withdrawal rights, 
a primary governance mechanism over hedge fund 
managers is the high propensity of investors to 
withdraw or not commit their funds in response to 
poor performance or governance. Unsurprisingly, 
hedge fund investors decide to invest largely based on 
 Institutional hedge fund investors typically demand some threshold level of quality with 
respect to governance and will withdraw their 
funds, or refuse to invest in the first place, if 
the fund lacks the desired quality. 
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51 See, e.g., Matthew Ridley, How to Invest in Hedge Funds: 
An Investment Professional’s Guide (2004).
52 See, e.g., Stephen J. Brown, William Goetzmann, Bing Liang & 
Christopher Schwarz, “Trust and Delegation,” 103(2) J. Fin. Econ. 221 
(2012); Stephen J. Brown, William Goetzmann, Bing Liang & Christo-
pher Schwarz, “Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence 
from Hedge Fund Registration,” 63(6) J. Fin. 2785 (2008).
53 For an overview of the sources of hedge fund financing, see 
generally Evolution of the Hedge Fund Financing Model (Barclays 
Capital Solutions Grp., Sept. 2012), available at http://www.
thehedgefundjournal.com/sites/default/files/evolution_of_financ-
ing_model.pdf.
54 Margin financing means to borrow against a particular 
investment position or an entire portfolio. Frank Barbarino, “Lever-
age, Hedge Funds, and Risk,” 6 (NEPC, 2009), available at http://
www.nepc.com/writable/research_articles/file/09_07_nepc_lever-
age_hf_and_risk.pdf.
55 In a repo transaction, the amount of short-term cash a hedge 
fund is able to raise depends upon the haircut being applied to the 
asset used as collateral. A hedge fund will not be able to raise as much 
short-term cash through repos when the perception of risk increases 
because it causes the haircut to the repo’s collateral to increase and 
the repo lenders’ willingness to fund the trade to decrease.
56 Hedge funds may also obtain leverage by borrowing securities 
(to short sell) or through synthetic leverage structures.
57 Orice M. Williams, Director Financial Markets and Community 
Investment, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, House of Repre-
sentatives, Hedge Funds: Overview of Regulatory Oversight, Coun-
terparty Risks, and Investment Challenges 30-32 (GAO-09-667T, 
2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09677t.pdf.50 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, supra note 49, at 50.
 Investor demand for quality operational practices 
can also be bolstered by the fact that investors may 
be able to detect fraud and other operational risks ex 
ante. There is an entire advisory industry dedicated 
to providing hedge fund due diligence services, which 
include making books and other materials available 
to prospective and current investors to assist them 
in assessing the operational quality of the funds. 51 In 
addition, a growing body of academic studies is avail-
able, which may also be able to help investors detect 
which hedge funds are more likely to commit fraud 
or suffer from other operational defi ciencies. 52 
 Short-Term Creditors and Counterparties. Hedge funds 
often obtain some form of short-term credit financing, 
or leverage, as part of their investment strategies. 53 
Leverage may come from margin collateral; 54 cash 
raised through short-term sales and repurchases 
(repos) of financial instruments; 55 and options, 
swaps, or other derivatives transactions. 56 Leverage 
is relevant to governance because it results in the 
funds being continuously and closely monitored by 
creditors and derivatives counterparties. Indeed, a 
2008 Government Accountability Office investigation 
of the oversight activities of prime brokers and other 
hedge fund creditors and counterparties took note 
of their stringent practices. 57 When hedge funds take 
that portfolio-level risks be subject to pre-defi ned lim-
its; that new positions be simulated before adoption; 
and that operational, counterparty, and liquidity risks 
be measured, identifi ed, limited, and tested. Although 
investors may demand lockups and other short-term 
redemption restrictions to preserve fund stability, they 
nonetheless prefer to be able to redeem most, if not 
all, of their capital within one year. 
 Investors also have strong preferences regarding 
transparency, seeking comprehensive, intelligible dis-
closures about risk, occurring anywhere from monthly 
to in real-time. In practice, an estimated 89 percent 
of hedge funds make at least monthly disclosures to 
investors. 50 
 Investors also seek an alignment between perfor-
mance fee payment period and investment horizon 
and, accordingly, express a desire for performance 
fees to be calculated on a multi-year basis to align 
incentives for long-term investments and prevent 
managers from being paid for investments that later 
result in losses. 
 Investors further expect that trade processing will 
be automated as much as possible, that internal con-
trols relating to trading will be automated and docu-
mented, and that fund service providers will be fully 
vetted and will interact frequently with management. 
When it comes to valuation, investors expect manag-
ers to have external oversight and well-documented 
practices and controls, especially with respect to 
illiquid assets, in order to guard against fraud and 
performance smoothing. 
 Surveys also indicate that, with respect to hedge 
fund board oversight and powers, investors prefer 
that boards have the power to replace managers, that 
service providers report directly to boards, and that 
boards (rather than managers) ultimately be respon-
sible for valuation and decisions regarding suspending 
fund redemptions. Investors also prefer that hedge 
fund directors sit on no more than 30 boards, that 
hedge fund boards have no fewer than three directors 
(at least two of whom are independent), that the man-
ager is represented on the board, and that directors 
are full-time, professional directors. 
 Although investors may demand lockups and other short-term redemption restrictions to 
preserve fund stability, they nonetheless prefer to 
be able to redeem most, if not all, of their capital 
within one year. 
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58 SEC Valuation and Liquidity Guidance for Registered Invest-
ment Companies, 87-102 (Inv. Co. Inst., 2011), available at http://
www.ici.org/pdf/pub_11_valuation_volume1.pdf.
59 Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D. Daniel & Narayan Y. Naik, “Do 
Hedge Funds Manage Their Reported Returns?,” 24(10) Rev. Fin. 
Stud. 3281, 3283 (2011).
60 Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni, Augustin Landier & 
Rabih Moussawi, “Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?,” 
68(6) J. Fin. 2383, 2432 (2013) (finding “data to test the conjecture 
that hedge funds manipulate stock prices at the the end of the month 
by buying some of their stock holdings before market close”).
61 Andrew J. Patton, Tarun Ramadorai & Michael Streatfield, 
“Change You Can Believe In? Hedge Fund Data Revisions,” J. Fin. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934543; 
George O. Aragon & Vikram Nanda, “Strategic Delays and 
Clustering in Hedge Fund Reported Returns,” 3 (Unpublished 
manuscript, Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://www.public.asu.
edu/~goaragon/Papers/HFDelay.pdf.
62 See generally Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Veronika K. Pool, “Do 
Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence From the 
Pooled Distribution,” 64 J. Fin. 2257 (2009).
63 From Manhattan to Madoff: The Causes and Lessons of 
Hedge Fund Operational Failure 6 (Castle Hall Alts., 2009), avail-
able at http://www.cfainstitute.org/learning/products/publications/
contributed/Pages/from_manhattan_to_madoff__the_causes_and_
lessons_of_hedge_fund_operational_failure.aspx.
 Fraud and Misreporting. The most basic type of 
hedge fund agency cost is manager fraud through 
misreporting some aspect of the fund’s returns, asset 
values, risk taking, or investment activities. Hedge fund 
investors may potentially be subject to higher agency 
costs from misreporting than are investors in regulated 
investment funds because hedge funds are not required 
to value their assets according to SEC guidelines. 58 
Studies have found data consistent with a wide 
variety hedge fund misreporting, including reporting 
higher returns in December by underreporting returns 
earlier in the year, 59 increasing the value of their stock 
holdings through end-of-month market purchases, 60 
and revising or delaying  poor past performance. 61 
Studies also suggest that some hedge funds may 
deliberately understate the volatility of their returns. A 
relatively common type of misreporting by managers 
is reporting small positive returns, as opposed to small 
losses. 62 The hedge funds most likely to misreport 
returns are those holding illiquid assets or assets 
that otherwise give managers discretion in valuation. 
Nonetheless, while misreporting may be significant 
when it takes place, it is not widespread. 63 
excessive risks, it is often their creditors (not their 
equity investors) that force them to close and liquidate 
their assets. 
 In margin fi nancing, hedge fund investment posi-
tions are evaluated and marked-to-market on a daily 
basis by prime brokers; a fund must add additional 
margin to the extent that the investments’ market 
value falls below a minimum threshold level (mainte-
nance margin). Prime brokers have full transparency 
over the investment positions of hedge funds using 
their services and are quick to terminate their rela-
tionships with funds failing to comply with their risk 
management protocols. Prime brokers’ relationships 
with hedge funds are also monitored by their own 
banking or securities regulators. 
 Hedge fund repo counterparties are also generally 
prudent about their short-term exposures to the funds 
and consider hedge funds among the riskiest type of 
counterparties, such that the funds receive a larger hair-
cut than other counterparties. Hedge fund derivatives 
counterparties typically require the funds’ trades to be 
supported by substantial amounts of collateral. 
 Discipline by creditors and counterparties may be 
inadequate to protect hedge fund investors, however. 
For example, hedge funds often use multiple prime 
brokers to fi nance their positions, which prevents any 
single broker from knowing a fund’s total leverage. In 
addition, competition for hedge fund clients may lead 
prime brokers to ease credit terms or fund oversight. 
 HEDGE FUND AGENCY COSTS 
 Hedge fund managers are the agents of their inves-
tors. Despite the investor-friendly governance devices 
that hedge funds adopt, the wide-ranging powers that 
the hedge fund legal regime bestows upon hedge fund 
managers potentially allows them to impose signifi -
cant agency costs on investors in the form of losses 
and ineffi ciencies. Hedge fund agency costs arise from 
fi ve primary sources: 
 1. Fraud or misreporting with respect to a fund’s 
performance and other characteristics; 
 2.  Incentive misalignments due to how hedge fund 
managers are compensated; 
 3.  Overly long redemption restrictions; 
 4.  Managers appropriating fund profi ts; and 
 5.  Managers favoring certain investors or service 
providers. 
 Empirical studies (cited in the following paragraphs) 
suggest that the most signifi cant source of agency costs 
is the subtle manipulation of performance returns 
(valuation) by managers when it suits their interests. 
 When hedge funds take excessive risks, it is often their creditors (not their equity 
investors) that force them to close and 
liquidate their assets. 
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64 Vikas Agarwal & Sugata Ray, “Determinants and Implica-
tions of Fee Changes in the Hedge Fund Industry,” 4-5 (Unpub-
lished manuscript , Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2024362.
65 Mark Perlow, “Managing Hedge Fund Conflicts of Interest,” 
40(7) Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. 75 (Apr. 2007), available 
at http://www.klgates.com/files/tempFiles/a3ff2ce8-8ff0-4971-
a8e9-34a575d155ce/Perlow_Review_of_Securities_Commodi-
ties_Regulation.pdf.
66 Id. A “most favored nation” side letter clause promises that an 
investor will be offered any superior terms offered to other investors.
67 Gregory Curtis, White Paper No. 4—Soft Dollars: Greycourt’s 
Position, 1 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.greycourt.com/wp-
content/uploads/file/White_Paper004-Soft_dollars-GDC.pdf.
68 See Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,409, Advisors Act Release No. 2224, 82 SEC Docket 2036 
(Mar. 31, 2004); Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., “SMH Capital 
Fined $450,000 for Procedural Failures Regarding Soft Dollar 
Payments, Distributing Improper Hedge Fund Sales Materials” 
(Press Release, Jan. 9, 2008), available at http://www.finra.org/
Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008/P037758.
funds increased or decreased some aspect of their fees 
over a three-year period. 64 
 Favoritism Toward Certain Investors or Service 
Providers. Hedge fund investors may suffer from 
agency costs because managers give favorable 
treatment to some investors over others or to service 
providers at the expense of investors generally. Through 
separate agreements known as “side letters,” certain 
hedge fund investors may obtain favorable terms for 
themselves that are not offered to all investors in the 
fund’s general offering documents. 65 Side letters may 
give selected investors favorable treatment regarding 
fees, disclosure, liquidity, and other terms. 66 Favorable 
liquidity or disclosure terms may allow some investors 
to exit the fund ahead of other investors and, thereby, 
create a conflict of interest between the manager and 
the investors that do not have the favorable terms. 
 Investors may also suffer from agency costs due to 
managers giving favorable treatment to service provid-
ers at their expense or appointing service provider repre-
sentatives to the fund’s board of directors. For example, 
hedge funds may pay for prime broker services with 
“soft dollar” payments—by directing trades to their 
prime broker or affi liated third parties, or paying above-
market rates for brokerage commissions. 67 Undisclosed 
soft dollar payments to prime brokers may constitute 
a confl ict of interest subject to an enforcement action 
by the SEC or other regulatory authorities. 68 
 IMPROVING HEDGE FUND GOVERNANCE 
 From the level and structure of fees to the amount 
and timing of disclosures, hedge fund governance can 
 Fee-Based Incentive Misalignments. Agency costs 
also arise from the structure of hedge fund managers’ 
annual compensation. Because managers earn 
performance fees on an annual basis for investment 
positions or strategies that may be longer-term in 
nature, a manager may be able to earn performance 
fees in the early years of a strategy and then pass losses 
along to investors when the investment ultimately 
suffers losses. Hedge fund managers may also have 
incentives to take on greater risk after obtaining 
investor capital because of the asymmetric payoff 
structure of their performance-based compensation 
arrangement: the manager shares in the profits of a 
fund with investors but not in fund losses. 
 In addition, management fees may impose agency 
costs on investors because, at least in the short term, 
a fi xed management fee is not dependent on perfor-
mance. For very large hedge funds, management fee 
compensation earned pursuant to management fees 
far exceeds the amount necessary to pay for operat-
ing overhead and, thereby, reduces the incentives for 
managers to earn profi ts for investors. 
 Restrictions on Investor Redemptions. The use 
of lockups, notice periods, or gates temporarily 
reduces investors’ ability to withdraw their capital 
and may permit the manager to use investor funds 
opportunistically for its own benefit, thereby 
imposing an agency cost on investors. Redemption 
restrictions also impose agency costs to the extent 
that the inability to withdraw capital imposes a 
foregone (opportunity) cost from not being able to 
use the capital elsewhere. 
 Overcompensation of Managers. Another potential 
hedge fund agency cost is that investors may pay more 
in fees than is necessary to produce a given level of 
returns, thereby allowing fund managers to capture a 
portion of the fund’s profits at the investors’ expense. 
One way for managers to appropriate fund profits 
is to increase fees  after good performance. Although 
most hedge funds do not change their fees with respect 
to any particular investor, a study of 3,814 funds from 
April 2008 until June 2011 found that 7.8 percent of 
 Hedge fund managers may also have incentives to take on greater risk after obtaining investor 
capital because of the asymmetric payoff structure 
of their performance-based compensation 
arrangement: the manager shares in the profits of 
a fund with investors but not in fund losses. 
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72 See 2011 New Hedge Fund Study (Seward & Kissel LLP 
Memorandum, Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://fundtaxservices.
com/PDFs/2011NewHedgeFundStudy.pdf.
73 See Ineichen, supra note 20, at 19 (noting that 24.6 percent 
of hedge funds pursue “event driven” strategies including invest-
ing around mergers and acquisitions and in illiquid distressed debt 
instruments).
74 See, e.g., Indraneel Chakraborty & Sugata Ray, “Effort, Risk 
and Walkaway Under High Water Mark Style Contracts,” 2, 20 
(Unpublished manuscript, Mar. 14, 2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1083089.
75 George O. Aragon & Vikram Nanda, “On Tournament 
Behavior in Hedge Funds: High Water Marks, Fund Liquidation, 
and the Backfilling Bias,” 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 937 (2012).
69 See generally Carl Ackermann, Richard McEnally & David 
Ravenscraft, “The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and 
Incentives,” 54(3) J. Fin. 833 (June 1999) (finding that in a sample 
of funds from 1988–1995, hedge funds consistently outperformed 
mutual funds in part because of incentive fees); Bing Liang, “On 
the Performance of Hedge Funds,” 55(4) Fin. Analysts J. 72 (July-
Aug. 1999) (finding that hedge funds exhibit superior risk-adjusted 
returns as compared to mutual funds).
70 Cecile Le Moigne & Patrick Savaria, “Relative Importance 
of Hedge Fund Characteristics,” 20 Fin. Mkts. Portfolio Mgmt. 
419, 424 (2006). But see Roy Kouwenberg & William T. Ziemba, 
“Incentives and Risk-Taking in Hedge Funds,” 31 J. Banking Fin. 
3291, 3308 (2007) (finding that “hedge funds with incentive fees 
have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees) and worse risk-
adjusted performance”).
71 See, e.g., Hung-Gay Fung, Xiaoqing Eleanor Xu & Jot Yau, 
“Global Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Market Timing,” 58(6) 
Fin. Analysts J. 19 (Nov.-Dec. 2002) (finding average hedge fund 
returns positively related to performance fees for a sample of 115 
equity funds from 1994 to 2000); William Fung & David A. Hsieh, 
“Hedge-Fund Benchmarks: Information Content and Biases,” 58 
Fin. Analysts J. 22 (Jan.-Feb. 2002).
 Another fee-related issue is the timing of perfor-
mance-based compensation. In particular, moving 
toward a multi-year compensation structure for man-
agers may be a signifi cant area for improvement. Cur-
rently, fewer than an estimated 10 percent of hedge 
funds measure manager performance over multi-year 
periods. 72 However, nearly a quarter of hedge funds 
pursue investment strategies that likely extend past an 
annual period 73 and, hence, should most likely adopt 
a multi-year performance fee measure. There are two 
basic ways to compensate managers on a basis longer 
than a year: 
 1.  Implement a rolling and deferred performance fee 
arrangement that calculates performance fees over 
a multi-year period to match the actual realized 
gains from an investment strategy; or 
 2.  Place a portion of the annual performance fees in 
an escrow account allowing investors to retrieve 
the fees if the fund experiences losses in subse-
quent years. 
 High-Water Marks. Empirical studies generally find 
that funds with high-water marks perform better than 
those without. 74 High-water marks (1) have generally 
been found to reduce managers’ incentive to increase 
risk after performing poorly, due to their aversion to 
falling even further below the mark, 75 and also (2) 
create incentives for managers to close or continue to 
operate poorly performing funds based on what is in 
the investors’ best interest. 
 However, there is also evidence of that problems 
can be caused by high-water marks. Compensating a 
be improved. This section offers suggestions for such 
improvement, based on academic and industry stud-
ies of how different governance structures impact the 
performance of hedge funds. Beyond a baseline set of 
general governance devices, there is likely no group of 
specifi c governance mechanisms that will optimize in-
vestor returns for investors in all hedge funds. This is 
because whether a particular governance mechanism 
will cause better performance depends on the charac-
teristics of the fi rm. Hedge funds pursue a wide va-
riety of investment strategies and hence have a wide 
range of characteristics. 
 Fees. Performance fees may benefit investors to the 
extent that they incentivize managers to improve their 
performance and attract more talented managers to the 
industry. However, performance fees are also a cost to 
investors, in that they are deducted from increases in 
the value of their assets. Empirical evidence supports 
the theory that performance-based compensation 
improves investors’ net-of-fee returns. Hedge fund 
performance fees, in part, account for the funds’ 
outperformance of mutual funds (which by law cannot 
charge asymmetric performance fees) 69 —and private 
investment funds that do not charge performance 
fees underperform those that do. 70 In addition, most 
studies examining the issue find that hedge funds that 
charge higher performance fees have better returns. 71 
Higher fees may induce managers to take undertake 
greater (and more skilled) effort and will make a fund 
more attractive to higher-skilled managers. Thus, 
a combination of high performance fees and low 
management fees may be optimal for investors. 
 A combination of high performance fees and low management fees may be optimal for 
investors. 
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the same risk-adjusted returns as a cheaper, passive 
investment vehicle (such as a stock index). Investors 
should also consider having the hurdle rate be based 
upon a specified level of correlation, instead of an 
absolute level of return. 79 That way, they will not have 
to pay fees for returns that they sought to avoid by 
investing in hedge funds in the first place (i.e., returns 
correlated with broader markets). 
 Managerial Co-Investment. Managerial co-investment 
unsurprisingly seems to align incentives and increase 
performance. One study of a representative sample of 
7,535 hedge funds from 1995 to 2004 found a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between 
co-investment and performance. 80 Co-investment 
may also increase the incentives for managers to close 
poorly performing funds when doing so is best for 
investors. However, there may be a governance trade-
off with co-investment. Co-investment beyond a certain 
level may decrease performance to the extent that 
high co-investment could result in the fund manager 
becoming too conservative. Although the optimal 
range of co-investment is an issue yet to be analyzed 
in depth, investors should require managers to make 
at least some significant amount of co-investment, 
including the reinvestment of profits into the fund to 
help assure long-term incentive alignment. 
 Transparency. Investors are best off when they receive 
all of the information they need on a timely basis to 
make informed investment decisions—but nothing 
more. Transparency in the hedge fund context refers 
to the extent and frequency of disclosures about a 
fund’s or manager’s performance, operations, and 
structure. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which 
effectively mandated that all hedge fund managers 
publicly disclose information on Form ADV, a typical 
established fund disclosed a significant amount of 
information about its investments, performance, 
and other characteristics. However, the level of 
transparency differed significantly among hedge funds, 
ranging from funds that provided only summary 
statistics of returns to those providing full, position-
level transparency. 81 Since the 2008 financial crisis, 
manager with an annual performance fee subject to a 
high-water mark might cause an incentive misalign-
ment between investors and managers when a fund’s 
performance drops signifi cantly below the mark. In 
these situations, earning a performance fee requires a 
substantial gain by year end, thereby giving the manag-
er an incentive to substantially increase risk. The reason 
for this is that coming in at, just below, or far below 
the high-water mark will all result in the manager not 
being paid any performance fee. 76 There is evidence of 
this “swing for the fences” effect. 77 One study found 
that as hedge funds fall below their high-water mark 
they increase risk, have lower expected risk-adjusted 
returns, and are more likely to close due to inability 
to ever recover losses to get “above water” (and hence 
allow managers to be paid performance fees). 78 For 
this reason, industry commentators have called for 
abolishing high-water marks altogether. High-water 
marks may also reduce returns by giving managers an 
incentive to lock-in profi ts by reducing their risk-taking 
after surpassing a high-water mark. 
 Hedge fund investors should accordingly consider 
investing in funds that (1) have attractive character-
istics but do not use high-water marks or (2) remove 
or reset their high-water marks if the fund drops 
substantially below the mark. The latter will remove 
the incentive for managers to take on undue risks in 
an attempt to reach the high-water mark, and will 
make it less likely that employees will leave a fund 
that is substantially under water. 
 Hurdle Rates. Hurdle rates are most likely to benefit 
investors in hedge funds whose returns are highly 
correlated to stock, bond, or other broad markets. 
Accordingly, investors should probably demand hurdle 
rates only in funds that run the risk of providing 
 High-water marks may also reduce returns by giving managers an incentive to lock-in profits 
by reducing their risk-taking after surpassing a 
high-water mark. 
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what information and level of transparency they 
seek. In addition, there is a great deal of practitioner 
literature on hedge fund disclosures, which typically 
differentiates between what information investors 
should look for prior to making an investment (due 
diligence) versus what should be the subject of their 
ongoing monitoring after they have invested with a 
fund. Studies by fi nancial economists also suggest 
that investors should focus on a particular fund’s risk, 
including operational risk. 86 In particular, investors 
should focus on disclosures about the uniqueness of 
the fund’s investment strategy and its lack of correla-
tion with broad market risk factors. 87 
 The foregoing analysis of transparency suggests 
that hedge fund investors should not seek real-time, 
position-level disclosure across the board or for every 
type of fund. Rather, they should focus on disclosures 
that provide the right level and frequency of meaning-
ful information about the manager’s strategy, invest-
ment risks, and operational controls. 
 Hedge Fund Directors. In the corporate context, strong 
boards are essential due to shareholder capital lock-
in. Because equity investors in corporations make a 
permanent contribution of capital to the firm, a board 
is needed to oversee management to ensure that the 
capital is used productively. In the hedge fund context, 
by contrast, investor capital is not locked-in and can be 
redeemed at any time, subject to relatively short-term 
and limited redemption restrictions. As a result, hedge 
fund investors may not need an intermediary board 
to protect their interests; they can protect themselves 
by simply cashing out of the fund. This likely explains 
why 85 percent of the hedge funds based in North 
investors have demanded more transparency and hedge 
funds have responded by increasing their disclosures 
and reporting. Nonetheless, investor surveys indicate 
that transparency remains a top concern. 82 
 Investors can generally make more informed in-
vestment decisions when they get more frequent and 
expansive hedge fund disclosures. More disclosure 
will also likely lower a hedge fund’s cost of capital 
and increase the liquidity of its shares in secondary 
markets by giving investors more information about 
the fund and the manager’s activities. 
 However, greater transparency does not always 
make investors better off. Investors may suffer from 
information overload and be unable to process vast 
amounts of information effectively. Even sophisticated 
investors may have diffi culty distinguishing between 
the unique aspects of different hedge fund disclo-
sures. 83 For hedge funds that hold illiquid securities 
or complex instruments, transparency into the fund’s 
investment positions is unlikely to give investors 
signifi cant insight into the fund’s investment strategy 
given the numerous potential ways the manager may 
be seeking to profi t from the relationship between the 
positions. 84 The fact that investors typically do not 
seek full position-level disclosures from managers 
or require managers to report performance in a way 
that mitigates performance-smoothing suggests that, 
beyond a certain point, additional transparency is not 
necessarily benefi cial. 85 
 A related issue is  what information about the fund 
is most important to investors when making invest-
ment decisions. Sophisticated hedge fund investors 
already have well-defi ned preferences regarding 
 For hedge funds that hold illiquid securities or complex instruments, transparency into 
the fund’s investment positions is unlikely to 
give investors significant insight into the fund’s 
investment strategy given the numerous potential 
ways the manager may be seeking to profit from 
the relationship between the positions. 
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policies and procedures and are more focused on 
specifi c issues, as opposed to a wide variety of gov-
ernance tasks. Third-party service providers have 
their own reputational incentives to provide a check 
on managers and are likely to be in a better position 
to effectively do so. 
 For example, when it comes to the important issue 
of valuing fund assets, a valuation committee can 
establish applicable valuation policies and procedures 
and address confl icts of interests in doing so. Then, 
third-party administrators should be hired to conduct 
their own independent valuation of fund assets, to 
the extent possible. So long as practices ensure that 
administrators are independent from managers, ad-
ministrators can provide investors with valuations 
that are free from confl icts of interests, a signal that 
managers are committed to accurate reporting, and 
a valuable “second opinion” when reliance on the 
manager to value illiquid assets is necessary. Relying 
on service providers has become more commercially 
feasible due to innovations that have reduced their 
cost and increased their ability to integrate into a 
fund’s operations. 
 Redemption Restrictions. Although redemption 
restrictions may impose agency costs on investors 
to the extent they do not help a fund’s performance, 
they may also allow investors to access funds with 
higher returns. In general, relatively long-term, illiquid 
investment strategies are a source of higher returns 
because such strategies are offered at a discount to 
compensate investors for giving up the ability to 
quickly exit the investment. 91 Long-term investment 
strategies may also allow investors to access unique 
sources of value not present in more widely available, 
short-term investment strategies. As a result, investors 
in hedge funds with illiquid strategies are compensated 
for illiquidity risk with higher returns. Illiquid hedge 
fund investment strategies may be undermined by 
frequent investor redemptions, however, because 
illiquid investments require more time to realize gains 
than do liquid investments. Indeed, empirical studies 
confirm that investors generally benefit when hedge 
funds use redemption restrictions that allow managers 
to realize gains from illiquid investments. 92 Lockups 
America do not have boards—and why there is no 
evidence that funds with boards perform better than 
those without them. 
 Likewise, investors in hedge funds with boards 
should hesitate before pressuring managers to adopt 
governance characteristics that appear to serve their 
interests. Empirical studies of corporate governance 
do not fi nd that “good governance,” including direc-
tor independence, increases performance. 88 Hedge 
funds may be particularly ill-served by independent 
directors because the funds’ investment strategy and 
risks are relatively diffi cult for outsiders, such as 
independent directors, to understand. Compensating 
hedge fund directors with equity interests in the fund 
as a way to align incentives should be considered; such 
compensation is associated with better performance 
in public companies. 89 Compensating directors with 
structured notes tied to the performance of the direc-
tor’s fund may be another way to align the director’s 
incentives. 90 
 Investors should be mindful that their efforts 
to reform hedge fund boards might also be prob-
lematic given that governing financial institutions 
seems particularly problematic. Given the inher-
ent complexity of the financial world, reliance on 
boards to monitor managers in banks has proven 
to be an ineffective model of governance. A hedge 
fund board may do little more than create a false 
sense of security among investors, while imposing 
significant costs. 
 Instead of relying on a board, investors should 
require funds to establish committees relevant to their 
areas of concern and rely on independent third-party 
service providers for monitoring. Internal committees 
can discipline a fund to commit to pre-established 
 Hedge funds may be particularly ill-served by independent directors because the funds’ 
investment strategy and risks are relatively 
difficult for outsiders, such as independent 
directors, to understand. 
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also limit access to certain investment strategies, such as 
those that invest in hard-to-value illiquid assets, mak-
ing it diffi cult to allocate the positions across different 
accounts. Managed accounts may also suffer from an 
agency cost in the form of adverse selection. Because 
managed accounts are a structure with governance de-
vices very much in the investor’s favor, the most sought-
after or skilled managers are generally not willing to 
accede to their terms. 97 Accordingly, investors may fail 
to assess the quality of managed account providers. In-
vestors in managed accounts also have a higher moni-
toring burden to ensure that the manager does not stray 
from its strategy, does not favor the funds it manages 
over its managed accounts, and adequately shadows any 
underlying fund it is meant to track. Finally, managed 
accounts also lack co-investment by managers, which 
is an important governance device and underlies hedge 
fund managers’ high pay-performance sensitivity. 
 The disadvantages of managed accounts refl ect the 
inherent limitations investors face when they attempt 
to obtain investor-friendly governance. Indeed, the 
limitations on managed accounts are precisely the 
reason why hedge fund investors may be better off 
with fewer disclosures, higher fees, and less access to 
their capital. Agreeing to those terms has its own set of 
disadvantages, but it has the benefi t of allowing inves-
tors to access a wider variety of hedge fund strategies 
and, more likely, higher skilled managers. 
 CONCLUSION 
 Although lower fees, greater liquidity, and more dis-
closures may generally improve governance and re-
turns, investors should take a measured approach in 
negotiating for such outcomes. Indeed, investors may 
benefi t from less disclosure, higher fees, and less ac-
cess to their capital. 
 With respect to fees, investors should seek rela-
tively low management fees in particularly large funds 
to prevent paying substantial non-performance-based 
fees to managers that go above their operating costs. 
may also have the benefit of preventing a fund from 
collapsing due to temporary poor returns, as they give 
managers enough time to recover losses. 
 Accordingly, managers should adopt redemption 
restrictions when doing so is consistent with the goals 
of a long-term investment strategy. Liquidity may not 
be as valuable as the premium investors receive for 
accepting restrictions on withdrawals. In addition, the 
development of increasingly liquid secondary markets 
for hedge fund shares should decrease the importance 
of short-term liquidity because a secondary market 
provides investors with an additional means of exit. 
 Managed Accounts. A hedge fund structure that may 
reflect an optimal governance arrangement for some 
investors is a managed account. With a managed 
account, an investor retains full ownership of its 
funds and hires the fund manager to invest the funds 
as a third party. 93 In a managed account, it is the 
responsibility of the investor to hire independent third-
party service providers and undertake the account’s 
operations (such as risk management and reporting). 94 
Managed accounts have become increasingly popular 
with investors since the 2008 financial crisis. 95 
 Benefi ts. The benefi ts of managed accounts relative 
to traditional hedge fund structures are that managed 
accounts give investors: 
 Greater transparency (providing as much as real-• 
time, position-level transparency); 
 At least some degree of direct control over how the • 
assets are managed; 
 A high degree of liquidity; and • 
 Greater control over how fees and taxes are • 
allocated. 96 
 Disadvantages. Managed accounts do have several 
disadvantages. One disadvantage is higher administra-
tive costs, which necessarily arise from establishing and 
operating numerous distinct accounts. These accounts 
 Investors generally benefit when hedge funds use redemption restrictions that allow 
managers to realize gains from illiquid 
investments. Lockups may also have the 
benefit of preventing a fund from collapsing 
due to temporary poor returns, as they give 
managers enough time to recover losses. 
TFI-2801.indb   41 10/13/2014   13:48:33
42 J O U R N A L  O F  T A X A T I O N  A N D  R E G U L A T I O N  O F  F I N A N C I A L  I N S T I T U T I O N S  September /Oc tober  2014  Vo l  28  /  No  1
Lower performance fees, on the other hand, may re-
duce the incentives of managers to perform well and 
reduce the ability of a fund to attract skilled manag-
ers. Greater use of performance fees calculated over a 
multi-year period is likely an area where governance 
can be substantially improved. 
 Investors also should not always attempt to negotiate 
greater redemption rights. Instead, they should focus 
on ensuring that performance fees and liquidity terms 
match the time horizon of the manager’s investment 
strategy, so managers are paid when actual invest-
ment gains are realized and investors do not withdraw 
their capital until the strategy has been implemented. 
Redemption rights will also matter less as secondary 
markets for hedge fund shares develop. Investors should 
also question the use of high-water marks and hurdle 
rates in certain contexts and attempt to have a manager 
invest a substantial portion of its own wealth, and a 
portion of fund profi ts, in the funds it manages. 
 In terms of transparency, real-time, position-level 
transparency may do little to produce more valuable 
information for investors. in fact, such a high level 
of transparency may unduly burden managers and 
reduce their competitive advantage. More important 
than real-time, position-level transparency is transpar-
ency about the strength of a hedge fund’s operational 
controls and the correlation of the fund’s returns with 
stock and credit markets. 
 Investors also should not pressure hedge funds to 
adopt boards or increase their reliance on, or expecta-
tions of, existing fund directors. They should instead 
pressure managers to establish proper internal com-
mittees and rely more on administrators and other 
third-party service providers to serve as an indepen-
dent check, especially in the area of performance 
reporting and valuation. To the extent boards are 
relied on, equity-based compensation for directors 
may make them more effective. Q 
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